GNSS诱导式欺骗相对码相位与欺信比关系的分析

The analysis of the relationship between GNSS-induced spoofing code phase and spoofing-to-signal ratio

  • 摘要: GNSS信号的强度较弱且其信号结构公开,因此易受到诱导式欺骗攻击. 此类攻击能够在接收机保持跟踪环路不失锁的条件下进行,且往往难以被实时检测. 为了深入研究诱导式欺骗的过程,提高对欺骗攻击的防御能力,重点分析了欺骗信号对接收机延迟锁定环(delay-locked loop,DLL)的影响,特别是欺骗信号对接收机码相位的牵引过程. 在假设频率锁定模式下,推导了欺骗信号与真实信号以及本地复制伪随机码之间的相对码相位差与欺信比(spoofing-to-signal ratio, SSR)的关系. 最后,通过环路仿真和GNSS接收机仿真验证了理论结果,证明了理论分析的有效性. 这一研究为提高GNSS系统的安全性与防御能力提供了理论支持.

     

    Abstract: The GNSS signals are weak, their signal structure is publicly available, making them vulnerable to spoofing attacks. These attacks can occur while the receiver maintains locked on the tracking loop and are often difficult to be detected in real time. To investigate the spoofing process and enhance defense mechanisms, this study analyzes the impact of spoofing signals on the delay-locked loop (DLL) of the receiver, particularly the code phase tracking process. Under the assumption of frequency-locking mode, the relationship between the relative code phase difference of the spoofing signal and the authentic signal, as well as the locally generated pseudo-random code, is derived. This relationship is also shown to depend on the spoofing-to-signal ratio (SSR). Theoretical results are verified through loop and GNSS receiver simulations, confirming the validity of the analysis. This research provides theoretical support for improving the security and defense capabilities of GNSS systems.

     

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