Detection method of spoofing in mobile terminal based on power variation
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摘要: 对欺骗信号的功率检测是目前最常用的欺骗检测方法之一,但欺骗源可以通过调整发射的信号功率,仍然可实现对环形范围内所有终端的欺骗攻击．针对该问题,本文提出了一种基于信号功率变化的移动终端欺骗干扰检测方法,该方法利用了真实卫星和欺骗源与终端在距离上差异的本质属性,通过终端运动情况下真实信号与欺骗信号在相同距离上信号功率变化的不同,实现对近距离欺骗干扰源的有效检测．本文建立了移动终端导航信号功率变化模型,并在此基础上给出了针对欺骗信号的二元假设检验方法．通过理论分析和仿真实验,验证了本文提出的基于信号功率变化的移动终端欺骗干扰检测技术的有效性,当干扰源距离终端小于2 000 m,终端运动距离大于200 m即可实现在1％的虚警概率下实现对97％以上欺骗攻击的有效检测．Abstract: Power detection of spoofing signal is one of the most commonly used spoofing detection methods. However, the spoofing source can still achieve spoofing attack on the terminal in the ring by adjusting the power of the transmitted spoofing signal. In order to solve this problem, this paper proposes a spoofing detection method for mobile terminals based on signal power Variation. This method utilizes the essential attributes of distance difference between real satellite and deception source and terminal, it can detect spoofing jamming sources in close range effectively. In this paper, the power ratio model of mobile terminal signal is established, and on this basis, the binary hypothesis test for deception signal is given. Through theoretical analysis and simulation experiments, the validity of the proposed spoofing detection technology for mobile terminals based on signal power variation is verified. When the distance between the jammer and the terminal is less than 2000 meters, and the distance between the terminal and the terminal is more than 200 meters, the effective detection of spoofing attack can be realized under 1％ false alarm probability.
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Key words:
- satellite navigation /
- spoofing attack /
- spoofing detection /
- mobile terminal /
- power variation
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