卫星导航信号电文加密技术研究与评估

申成良; 郭承军

doi:10.13442/j.gnss.1008-9268.2018.03.002

卫星导航信号电文加密技术研究与评估

doi: 10.13442/j.gnss.1008-9268.2018.03.002

电子科技大学电子科学技术研究院,四川成都 611731

详细信息

作者简介:
申成良(1993-),男,硕士研究生,主要从事卫星导航抗欺骗干扰研究。

通讯作者:
申成良 E-mail: shencl_harsh@163.com[

计量
- 文章访问数: 493
- HTML全文浏览量: 74
- PDF下载量: 98
- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 刊出日期: 2018-09-05

Study and Evaluation of GNSS Signal Cryptographic Authentication Defenses

Research Institute of Electronic Science & Technology,University of Electronic Science & Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China

摘要

摘要: 全球导航卫星系统民用信号的信号结构公开等特点,使得民用接收机受到了各种欺骗干扰的威胁。针对不同的欺骗干扰攻击,对比分析了不同电文加密技术的鲁棒性。分析表明,电文加密技术不能应对转发式干扰攻击。在对比了椭圆曲线数字签名(ECDSA)和时间效应流丢失认证(TESLA)的基础上,提出了ECDSA和TESLA组合的导航信息认证(NMA)方案。该方案解决了传统NMA的运算量和时间同步等问题。以扩频码身份认证(SCA)技术为例,仿真评估了电文加密身份认证技术的性能。仿真表明,参与身份认证能大大提高接收机的抗干扰性能。
- 全球导航卫星系统 /
- 抗欺骗干扰 /
- 导航信息认证 /
- 扩频码身份认证
Abstract: Due to the public signal structure of the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) civil signal, civil receivers are threatened by a variety of spoofing attacks. For different spoofing attacks, the robustness of different authentication techniques is compared and analyzed. The analysis shows that authentication techniques fail to handle forward spoofing attacks. Based on the comparison of elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA) and time effect stream loss authentication (TESLA), the navigation information authentication (NMA) scheme of combination of ECDSA and TESLA is proposed. The proposed authentication scheme solves the problem of the computation and time synchronization of the traditional NMA techniques. Finally, the spreading code authentication (SCA) technique is used as an example to evaluate the performance of the cryptographic authentication techniques by simulation. The simulation shows that authentication can greatly improve the antispoofing performance of civil receivers.
- GNSS /
- anti-spoofing /
- navigation information authentication /
- spreading code authentication

HTML全文

参考文献(11)

[1]	PSIAKI M L, HUMPHREYS T E. GNSS spoofing and detection［J］. Proceedings of the IEEE, 2016, 104(6):1258-1270.
[2]	WESSON K, ROTHLISBERGER M, HUMPHREYS T. Practical cryptographic civil GPS signal authentication［J］. Navigation, 2012, 59(3):177-193.
[3]	FERNNDEZHERN MNDEZ I, RIJMEN V, SECO GRANADOS G, et al. A navigation message authentication proposal for the Galileo open service［J］. Navigation, 2016, 63(1):85-102.
[4]	DAN B. Digital signature standard (DSS)［M］. Springer US,2011.
[5]	唐超,孙希延,纪元法,等. GNSS民用导航电文加密认证技术研究［J］. 计算机仿真, 2015, 32(9):86-90.
[6]	SCOTT L. Anti-spoofing and authenticated signal architectures for civil navigation systems［C］// In Proc. ION GNSS Global Positioning Systems Conf., Portland, OR, 2003:15431552.
[7]	KUHN M G. An asymmetric security mechanism for navigation signals［M］. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005:239-252.
[8]	POZZOBON O. Keeping the spoofs out: Signal authentication services for future GNSS［J］, Inside GNSS, 2011,6(3):48-55.
[9]	HUMPHREYS T E. Detection strategy for cryptographic GNSS anti-spoofing［J］. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace ＆ Electronic Systems, 2015, 49(2):1073-1090.
[10]	BORIO D, CAMORIANO L, LO PRESTI L. Impact of the acquisition searching strategy on the detection and false alarm probabilities in a CDMA receiver［C］／／Position, Location, And Navigation Symposium, 2006 IEEE／ION. IEEE Xplore, 2006:1100-1107.
[11]	谢钢. GPS原理与接收机设计［M］. 北京：电子工业出版社, 2009:358-362.