Review of SBAS authentication techniques
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摘要: 卫星导航欺骗信号是卫星导航系统服务的重要威胁之一，严重影响导航、定位、授时(positioning, navigaing, timing，PNT)服务，如何提升导航系统服务的安全性，已成为卫星导航服务亟待解决的问题. 卫星导航信号认证是卫星导航系统端提升民用信号防欺骗的新兴技术手段，也是目前各大卫星导航系统的重要发展方向和研究热点. 星基增强系统(Satellite-Based Augmentation System，SBAS)作为卫星导航系统的核心增强系统，目前正在国际民航组织(International Civil Aviation Organization，ICAO)框架下推进SBAS电文认证标准，以期在未来提供SBAS电文认证服务. 伴随着我国北斗星基增强系统(BeiDou Satellite-Based Augmentation System，BDSBAS)建设完成以及下一代北斗导航系统的设计与研制，BDSBAS需要考虑在ICAO下提供SBAS电文认证服务，为用户提供更加安全可信的PNT服务. 本文首先阐述了SBAS电文认证概念，然后梳理了SBAS电文认证发展历程，进一步分析了SBAS电文认证技术面临的热点问题，以期为BDSBAS电文认证服务设计提供技术支撑.
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关键词:
- 星基增强系统(SBAS) /
- 电文认证 /
- 抗欺骗 /
- 北斗星基增强系统(BDSBAS) /
- 时间效应流丢失容错认证机制
Abstract: In response to the threat of vulnerability of satellite navigation systems to spoofing, which will seriously affect the impact of navigation, positioning and timing services. How to enhance the security of navigation system services has become one of the issues that need to be addressed in satellite navigation services. Satellite navigation signal authentication is an emerging technical means to enhance civil signal anti-spoofing in satellite navigation systems, and it is also one of the important development directions and research hotspots of major satellite navigation systems at present. As the core augmentation system of the satellite navigation system, the satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) system is currently promoting the SBAS message authentication standard under the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) with a view to providing SBAS message authentication service in the future. Along with the completion of the construction of China’s BeiDou satellite-based augmentation system and the design and development of the next-generation BeiDou navigation system, the BeiDou satellite-based augmentation system needs to consider the provision of SBAS message authentication services under the framework of ICAO standards, in order to provide users with more secure and trustworthy PNT services. This paper firstly elaborates on the concept of SBAS message authentication, then combs through the development history of SBAS message authentication, and then analyzes the hot issues faced by SBAS message authentication technology, which will provide technical support for the subsequent message authentication service of BeiDou satellite-based augmentation system.-
Key words:
- SBAS /
- message authentication /
- anti-spoofing /
- BDSBAS /
- TESLA
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表 1 SBAS I支路和Q支路技术分析
指标 分析结果 信道实施 I支路更优，Q支路需要满足Res 609 SBAS工程实施成本 I支路更优，FAA ROM 成本评估Q支路将增加50%成本 I/Q处理 I支路更优，因为Q支路增加了额外的
基带接收处理捕获跟踪处理 I支路和Q支路接近，但是Q支路具有
更快的速度潜力对 1164 ~1215 MHz有效功率通量密度的影响Q支路有可能超过Res 609的限制，
需要评估其可行性对信噪比预算的影响 L5Q技术体制受Res 609的限制 
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表 2 SBAS-L1新增认证电文帧
数据类型 电文类型 最大更新周期/s SBAS-L1身份认证信息 20 6 TESLA密钥链的根密钥和对应签名 21-1 120 二级公钥和对应签名 21-2 360 CA公钥 21-3 360
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表 3 SBAS-L5新增认证电文帧
数据类型 电文类型 最大更新周期/s SBAS-L5身份认证信息 50 6 TESLA密钥链的根密钥和对应签名 51-1 120 二级公钥和对应签名 51-2 360 CA公钥 51-3 360
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表 4 SBAS新增认证电文帧设计列表
方案 优点 缺点 使用MT24代替MT4 实现最简单，
直接替换可广播卫星数少，首次定位时间最慢，电文最大更新周期最大 使用动态MT1并减少MT4 对其他电文的
影响较小优化不明显 减少MT2-MT5的频率 最大更新周期较前两种有所减小，首次定位时间最快 为保证完好性，需要新增MT6
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表 5 三种MAC方案的性能对比
方案 BigMAC LittleMAC aMAC 密钥长度/bits 115 128 92 MAC长度/bits 30 16 28 密钥安全性 较强 较强 较强 MAC安全性 强 弱 中 能否精准确认错误帧 否 5帧中的某一帧 5帧中的某一帧
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表 6 国内外算法参数对比
对比项 数字签名算法 杂凑密码算法 对称加密算法 SM2 ECDSA-P256 SM3 SHA-256 SM4 AES-128 安全等级 128 128 128 128 128 128 密钥长度 私钥：256
公钥：512私钥：256
公钥：256128 128 输出长度 512 512 256 256 128 128
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表 7 SBAS新增认证电文帧设计特性
方案 优点 缺点 AtU 错误电文经过认证后直接被拒绝使用，提供最高程度的保护，防止潜在的欺骗攻击，不会使接收机暴露在欺骗电文下 认证有延迟，需要额外的存储资源，进一步可用性和连续性也会受到影响. 目前尚不清楚是否真的需要这种程度的保护 UtA 不影响服务连续性 接收机将在一定时间暴露在欺骗电文下，攻击者会有几秒钟的时间来降低计算的保护级别. 目前尚不清楚这种袭击是否会造成实际伤害
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